Svalbard: A Testing Ground for Future Authoritarian Ambitions

The charter boat from Longyearbyen, M/S Polargirl, moored at the dock in Barentsburg. Photo: Brian Moscioni

On the northern edge of the world, deep inside the Arctic Circle, a little-known archipelago is gaining attention – but not for reasons most governments want. Svalbard, a Norwegian territory located so far north that it nearly slips beneath the search bar on a smartphone’s Google Maps, is increasingly a focal point of geopolitical competition among major powers.

The islands, which are undisputed Norwegian territory, have become center-stage to “gray-zone” tactics used by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. These tactics are diplomatic infractions and military displays meant to push the boundaries of what is legal under Norway’s rule-of-law without resorting to blatant and open acts of warfare. How Norway responds may determine if Svalbard maintains its status as an international research hub or becomes defined by its importance in global trade and military security.

The most notable aspect that makes Svalbard so unique is an international treaty. A document called the Svalbard Treaty was signed by fourteen initial countries in 1920 and entered into force in 1925. Today, more than forty signatory countries of the Svalbard Treaty contractually agree that Svalbard is under “the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway” (Article 1) and that they “shall have equal liberty of access […] subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality” (Article 3). As of this writing, those forty countries include the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and North Korea.

Since the Treaty’s implementation in 1925, mining operations, historically the dominant economic driver on Svalbard, have largely come to a halt. Longyearbyen, the main settlement on Svalbard, closed its last coal mine in June 2025. Today, tourism and research are the primary means of commercial activity. Barentsburg, however, a Russian settlement just west of Longyearbyen, still keeps its mines open even though they are not financially viable and have not generated revenue for decades. Barentsburg is an odd corner of NATO territory that still has a bust of Vladimir Lenin in the middle of town and is only kept afloat through Russian state subsidies – a clear indication that Russia’s desire to maintain a foothold on Svalbard is strategic and not economic.

However, the Svalbard Treaty also prohibits the construction of military bases and fortifications. Article 9, only a mere one-sentence-long, denies the islands to be used for “warlike purposes” – leaving much room for interpretation. In August 2025, Russia took advantage of the Svalbard Treaty’s centennial to accuse Norway of deliberately abusing its sovereignty “to the detriment of [Russian] interests and […introducing] new restrictions for Russia in performing economic and scientific activities in [Svalbard].” In my interview with Terje Aunevik, the current Mayor of Longyearbyen, Terje acknowledged the possibility that Russia is accusing Norway of violations to justify their own infractions – one such example of Svalbard becoming a focal point of gray-zone tactics.

“Russia is showing the world in Ukraine what it is capable of in terms of violating international law,” Terje said. The Barents Observer reported in May 2023 that Russia illegally flew a military Mi-8 helicopter through Barentsburg, among several other violations of local Svalbard laws. Separately, as recently as September, Russia flew military aircraft into Estonian airspace and military drones into Polish airspace, likely as a means to gauge the level of response to provocations.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been accused of deploying a number of intelligence assets and electronic disruption measures against the far north Norwegian town of Kirkenes which borders Murmansk, Russia. Aunevik says incidents in Svalbard may not be “specifically tied to Kirkenes, but the overall security environment [in Longyearbyen] has changed.” In August, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Norway released that they “have major plans to build up scientific and research activities, develop tourism, transport accessibility, improve and upgrade Russian settlements’ infrastructure” throughout Svalbard. Gray-zone tactics are not a new tool for Russia, but the utilization of these methods are becoming more concentrated on Svalbard as the Arctic Circle captures evermore geopolitical attention.

Unsurprisingly, Chinese interest in the high-North archipelago is also increasing. According to a recent study by the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative, one percent of Svalbard’s ice mass melted in summer 2025, more than twice as fast as any other year on record. As these record-setting trends continue, Arctic trade routes are becoming more sought after. While trade tensions continue to intensify between Washington and Beijing, China may find that these northern shipping routes are a means of economic survival by connecting their market to Europe’s. The importance of this region to Beijing has drawn even more attention since China declared itself the status of a “Near-Arctic State” in 2018 and announced their “Polar Silk Road” initiative within the country’s first-ever Arctic Policy.

Terje Aunevik believes that there may also be a masked component of Chinese presence on Svalbard. “There have been reports – for example, from the energy plant – of unusual photography outside sensitive sites. I still believe intelligence activity exists, and I don’t know whether some [Chinese] tourists have other missions.” Additionally, as reported by Radio Free Asia, a Chinese tourism company recently brought a group of more than 100 tourists to Svalbard to visit China’s Yellow River Research Station. Among the group was a woman dressed in Chinese military fatigues and insignia. Just last year, the country sent a delegation to Barentsburg seeking increased cooperation in the region between China and Russia.

China, similar to its “‘no forbidden’ areas of cooperation” partner, Russia, is well-versed in gray-zone tactics. Numerous examples can be referenced from Chinese military activity in the South China Sea. A joint Sino-Russian drill entered the air defense identification zones (ADIZs) of South Korea and Japan in December of 2025, not unlike a joint exercise they conducted into the Alaskan ADIZ in 2024. It would be naïve to believe that similar tactics could not be used in the Arctic. As China and Russia increase their fleet of icebreaker ships they will likely cooperate in efforts to keep sea routes open, increase infrastructure and exploit resources, all to their advantage.

Russia and China will likely work towards common ends in the development of future Arctic governance, a subject China explicitly stated in their 2018 Arctic Policy. Together, the two powers may use their partnership to fill the gaps of a retreating America. The United States 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) indicates a strong shift of focus to the Western Hemisphere, with criticism of Europe for “lack of self-confidence”, and even advocating to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” with Russia. Similarly, the NSS lacks an assertive stance on China. These are green lights for Russia and China to further assert themselves in Svalbard.

But, Svalbard is not contested land. The Treaty exists to “[see] these territories [are] provided with an equitable regime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilization…”. However, gray-zone tactics by authoritarian regimes are pushing the boundaries of this privilege. When asked whether Svalbard would see increased militarization, Aunevik responded confidently that any military activity will always abide “within the frames of the treaty.” He says, “Norwegian authorities are very focused on calmness and stability – de-escalation rather than heating things up.”

“Still,” he says, “Norway has a duty to be capable of protecting the islands against any threat – present or future – which necessarily includes military forces.”

Recent imposing comments by President Trump on Greenland are serving as an example of a treaty territory being manipulated by its much more powerful neighbor. Denmark, a long-time loyal ally to the United States, has been put in a fight or flight situation by the White House. As Washington forges forward with new precedent in the Arctic, now more than ever, communication by Oslo will be a critical factor in enforcing Svalbard’s territory and deterring gray-zone tactics that counter the spirit of the Svalbard Treaty’s creation.

Exercised heavily during the Cold War, effective countermeasures to gray-zone tactics have since atrophied. Today, we are witnessing the weak points of globalization become more apparent, the legitimacy of multilateral organizations are losing their foundation, and the beacon of democracy is changing its course from the rules-based international order. As a result, assertive authoritarian powers are more emboldened to challenge agreements like the Svalbard Treaty.

Now, Norway is in a precarious situation. A critical question is posed: Can assertive diplomacy by Norway effectively preserve Article 9 of the treaty, or will the cooperative spirit of relations on Svalbard fall by the wayside in order to protect sovereign territory from ambitious foreign powers?

Brian Moscioni is a researcher at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Brian has visited Svalbard, and subsequently interviewed the mayor of Longyearbyen, Terje Aunevik.